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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 981421-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from judgment
of conviction for Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony,
and Theft, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A.
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is in Addendum B.
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue:

Whether the search of Appellant's home violated the

Fourth Amendment, requiring that items seized pursuant to the
search warrant and statements made by Appellant be suppressed.
A.

Whether Aimee acted as an agent for Deputy

Delahunty when she entered McArthur's home and seized
evidence.
B.

Whether items seized by police officers when acting

pursuant to a search warrant must be suppressed since the
search warrant was the fruit of Aimee's prior illegal
search.
C.

Whether Deputy Delahunty recklessly or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

intentionally included false statements and omitted material
information from the affidavit, requiring suppression of
items seized pursuant to the search warrant.
D.

Whether McArthur's statements upon arrest should be

suppressed as the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation.
Standard of Review:

This Court "review[s] the factual

findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress using a clearly erroneous standard.

[It]

review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law based on these
facts under a correctness standard."

State v. Brown, 853 P.2d

851, 854 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
781-82 (Utah 1991)).
Preservation:

The issues raised in this appeal were

preserved by Appellant's motion to suppress (R. 24-26), the
hearing on the motion to suppress (R. 114), and the trial judge's
ruling (R. 92). See Addenda C and D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On July 9, 1997, the State filed an Information charging
Defendant/Appellant Michael Todd McArthur ("Appellant" or
"McArthur") with one count of Burglary, a second degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and one count of
theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (1995).
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized from his home.
is in Addendum C.

R. 24-26.

A copy of the motion

After the state filed its responsive
2
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memorandum (R. 28-37), the trial judge held an evidentiary
hearing on the suppression motion.

R. 38. Thereafter, the trial

judge denied Appellant's motion to suppress and requested that
the state prepare the order.

R. 38.

The state prepared proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law which did not accurately reflect the trial court's rulings
and which contained findings which were not made by the trial
judge.

R. 75-76, 92. Appellant objected to the findings and

conclusions prepared by the state, and submitted proposed
findings and conclusions which were patterned after the trial
judge's actual ruling.

R. 89-90.x

Thereafter, the trial judge

issued a minute entry adopting the findings and conclusions
prepared by Appellant.

R. 92. A copy of the findings and

conclusions is in Addendum D.

The transcript of the trial

judge's oral findings is also in Addendum D.

R. 114:105-06.

On January 16, 1998, Appellant entered a conditional plea of
guilty to Theft, a second degree felony, and Burglary, a second
degree felony.

That plea was made pursuant to Ut.R.Crim.P. 11

and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah App. 1988), and
preserved for appeal the denial of Appellant's motion to
suppress.

R. 51-58.

On June 22, 1998, the trial judge entered

judgment, sentencing Appellant to two concurrent terms of one to
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison, and staying execution of
1

Appellant continued to maintain his Fourth Amendment claim.
Appellant's submission of findings and conclusions which reflected
the judge's actual ruling did not waive that claim; instead, it
simply provided the judge with a written statement of his previous
ruling.
3
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the prison sentence and placing Appellant on probation on the
condition he serve 12 months in jail and various other terms.
R. 99.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 1, 1997, Deputy Vaun Delahunty2 obtained a search
warrant to search the McArthur residence located at 2802 East
3900 South in Salt Lake County.
Addendum E.

State's Exhibit (IfExh.M) 1; see

The affidavit in support of the search warrant

indicated that certain property consisting of a Waterford Crystal
ashtray, various Lladro porcelain statues and a gold Dunhill
cigarette lighter, which the officer believed to be evidence of
crimes of burglary, theft and theft by receiving would be found
at the McArthur residence.

See Addendum E.

In support of the search warrant, the affidavit alleged that
the Salt Lake City residence of a Mr. Clark was burglarized in
early March, 1997, and items of personal property, "including
numerous guns, computers, electronics, art objects, clothing,
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco
automobile and other items" were taken.

Exh. 1 at 2.

Additionally, the affidavit stated:
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the
first part of March 1997, she was with Michael Todd
McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said they were
"going to work." The next morning when Aimee went back
to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men
2

The transcript indicates that the deputy's name was John
Dellapiana. This appears to be incorrect. The Information, Search
Warrant, Motion to Suppress filed by Appellant, and Memorandum
filed by the state all refer to the officer as Deputy Vaun
Delahunty. See R. 3-4, 24-6, 28-37; State's Exh. 1.
4
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unloading numerous items of personal property from
Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The next day
Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had
obtained the property, which is Mr. Clark's residence.
On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
There she obtained a Kbar Marine Fighting Knife in a
distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's
bedroom and a Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from
an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has
identified these items as being among those stolen in
the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a
matching crystal ashtray on the above-mentioned
entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the
home on 30 June 1997. Aimee observed the defendant in
possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette
lighter. On 3 0 June 1997, she used it to light up a
cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his
Home Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and
a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter.
Exh. 1 at 2.
The affidavit did not mention that on June 30, 1997, Deputy
Delahunty picked Aimee up in West Jordan so that Aimee could go
to the McArthur house in the Holladay area and take some items
out of the home.

R. 114:18, 28.

Aimee had told the deputy she

could get evidence including a knife and crystal object from
McArthur's home.

R. 114:19, 24-5.

Delahunty agreed to Aimee

taking the property and told her, "that will be great."
R. 114:65.

The officer picked Aimee up and transported her to

the house so that she could take the evidence out of the house
and give it to him.

R. 114:46.

He knew that the house was the

McArthur residence and suspected that it was the home of
Appellant's mother.

R. 114:45.

The affidavit also did not mention that the deputy waited in
the car in the driveway while Aimee took the items out of the
5
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house.

R. 114:46.

Delahunty admitted that he "was kind of

nervous about the situation."

R. 114:20.

Aimee went to the

front door, which was locked, then walked to the east side of the
house, and the officer lost sight of her.

R. 114:20.

Aimee

returned to the officer's car five to ten minutes later with a
Tupperware bin containing personal property, a crystal ashtray
and a Marine Corps fighting knife.

R. 114:21.

She immediately

turned the ashtray and knife over to Delahunty, who kept the
items and initiated a search warrant.

R. 114:23.

Aimee told

Delahunty that she used a cigarette lighter, which she claimed
McArthur kept on his person, while she was inside the McArthur
residence.

R. 114:66.

Aimee reported to the deputy that she had entered the
residence through the east door, but did not tell him whether the
door was open or how she had gained access.
that McArthur and his niece were at home.

R. 114:22.

She said

R. 114:22.

The affidavit also did not mention that the deputy did not
obtain consent to search the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997.
All of the June 30, 1997 information in the affidavit was
obtained when Aimee entered the residence while Deputy Delahunty
sat in his car in the driveway.
Additionally, the affidavit did not mention that Aimee had
been picked up after trying to pass checks which were stolen in
the burglary.

R. 114:4-5.

Aimee had the stolen checks in her

possession and therefore was in possession of stolen property.
R.114:35.

She had been cashing the stolen checks and admitted
6
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committing forgeries with those stolen checks.

R. 114:35-6.

Because she possessed property stolen in the burglary, Aimee was
also a possible suspect in the burglary.

R. 114:37.

Aimee's

work with Delahunty came about because she had been picked up on
the forgeries.

R. 114:40.

The burglary in this case occurred on March 3 or 4, 1997.
Deputy Delahunty, a burglary detective who had been with the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's office for eighteen years, was one of the
officers investigating the burglary.

R. 114:3.

He became aware

of Aimee when Sgt. Wardell told him in late May or early June to
contact Deputy Flores, who was investigating Aimee's forgeries.
R. 114:4-5.

Deputy Flores gave Delahunty the address of an

apartment on Redwood Road where he could reach Aimee.

R.114:5.

Deputy Delahunty went to the apartment on Redwood Road and
was told that Aimee had moved.

R. 114:5.

The occupants of the

apartment gave Delahunty a phone number and told him that Aimee
was living at that location with her boyfriend's mother.
R. 114:5.3
Delahunty located the address associated with the phone
number he had been given.
3900 South.

R. 114:6.

R. 114:6.

That address was 2802 East

Delahunty ascertained that the house was

the McArthur home and believed that the house was probably owned
3

Appellant objected to this testimony as hearsay and lacking
in reliability in violation of due process. R. 114:6. The trial
judge admitted it "to show why he did what he did," but indicated
that the testimony did not "go[] to the truth of the matter
asserted."
R. 114:6.
Since the testimony was not admitted to
prove that Aimee lived in the McArthur house, it does not provide
support for such a finding.
7
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by McArthur's mother.

R. 114:45, 48. 4

Deputy Delahunty went to the McArthur address on June 16,
1997, and knocked on the door.
R. 114:7.

R. 114:7.

A child answered.

When the officer asked if Aimee was there, the child

responded, "yes," then got Aimee.

R. 114:7.5

The deputy identified himself to Aimee and asked whether she
knew anything about the burglary.
nervous and asked to talk later.

R. 114:7.

Aimee appeared

R. 114:7.

The next day, June 17, 1997, Aimee went to the police
substation where she was interviewed by Delahunty.

R. 114:8, 14.

She told Delahunty that she was at Dominic Newman's house late at
night on May 3, 1997.6

According to Aimee, McArthur was also

there, and he and Newman told everyone that they were "going to
work."

R. 114:11.

Aimee said that everyone laughed because

"going to work" meant committing a burglary.

R. 114:11.

Aimee said that the next day, she returned to Newman's house
and saw Newman and Appellant unloading items from Appellant's car

4

During his testimony, Delahunty suggested that Aimee worked
with him because "she wanted to come clean and get her life in
order" and "got religion."
R. 114:39.
She did not approach
Delahunty, however, and agreed to work with him only cifter she had
been picked up on the forgeries and knew "she was in a possible bad
position." R. 114:4-5, 39.
5

At the preliminary hearing, Delahunty did not testify that
he had seen Aimee at the residence on June 16, 1997. Instead, he
testified that the only information he had indicating that Aimee
might have lived at the McArthur residence at some time was
hearsay. R. 114:50.
6

The officer testified that this incident occurred on May 3,
1997 rather than on March 3, 1997, when the burglary occurred.
R. 114:11.
8
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and taking them into Newman's house.

R. 114:11.

The items,

which included, among other things, guns, Chinese vases and
crystal, were put in a closet or displayed in Newman's house.
R. 114:11-12.

According to Delahunty, these items were similar

to what was taken in the burglary.

R. 114:12.

Aimee also told

Delahunty that Newman had described to her how he and McArthur
had disassembled the gate in order to gain entry, and had taken
Aimee to the burglarized property.

R. 114:12.

At some point in mid-June, 1997, Aimee also told Deputy
Delahunty that Appellant had some of the stolen property at his
house, which was located at 2802 East 3900 South.

R. 114:15.

Aimee said that McArthur wore some of the stolen property and
kept some in his bedroom.

R. 114:16.

According to Delahunty,

taking the property from McArthur's home was Aimee's idea, but
the deputy agreed to it and told Aimee it would be great if she
got the property from McArthur's home.

R. 114:19.

On June 19, 1997, Delahunty picked up Aimee in West Jordan.
R. 114:17.
friend.

At that time, she was staying in West Jordan with a

R.114:17.

The purpose of the June 19 excursion was to

have Aimee direct Delahunty to the burglarized house, which she
did.

R. 114:14, 17.
Between June 17 and 30, 1997, although Delahunty drove by or

was near the McArthur house everyday, he did not see Aimee at the
McArthur residence.

R. 114:44.7

Delahunty testified that as of

7

According to Delahunty, Aimee had told him that she was out
of state for a period of time in June 1997 attending to details
after her grandfather passed away in South Dakota. R. 114:68-9.
9
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June 19, Aimee was staying with a friend in West Jordan and he
picked her up in West Jordan on two occasions; he also testified
that when he took Aimee to the McArthur residence to take items,
Aimee indicated she had access to the house because she was
living there.

R. 114:19.

Delahunty knew that as of June 19,

Aimee had begun staying with friends.

R. 114:64.

He testified

that he did not know where she was living on June 19, and that
she may not have been living at the McArthur house.

R. 114:64.

He also testified that he thought she was living there "on and
off" but did not ask her for consent to search because he "didn't
feel good about" it since her name was not McArthur, and because
he did not think "she had the legal right to grant a search."
R. 114:54.
Deputy Lone testified that the McArthur house was not
Aimee's permanent residence, and that she had stayed there as a
guest rather than living there on an ongoing basis.

R. 114:74.

Tracy McArthur, Appellant's mother, testified Aimee had
stayed in the house for a little while, but had moved out long
before the search warrant was executed.

R. 114:79.

Aimee

visited occasionally, as she had for about ten years.

R. 114:82.

After Delahunty took Aimee to the McArthur house to get
items inside, he drove Aimee to a friend's house, then initiated
a search warrant.

R. 114:23.

Delahunty obtained the search

warrant on July 1, 1997, the day after he took Aimee to the
McArthur house.

See Addendum E.

Delahunty and other officers served the warrant on July 3,
10
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1997.

R. 114:30.

When they served the warrant, they entered the

house through an unlocked sliding glass door on the east side of
the house.

R. 114:30.

They found McArthur and another young man

in a bedroom-type area in the basement.

R. 114:30-1.

As part of the search, officers recovered a number of items
which Delahunty indicated fit the descriptions of items taken in
the burglary.

R. 114:32.

Delahunty interrogated McArthur when

he served the search warrant.

R. 114:32.

McArthur waived his

Miranda rights and made incriminating statements regarding the
burglary.

R. 114:32-3.

Delahunty did not know whether any charges were filed
against Aimee.

R. 114:25, 65. He knew that Deputy Flores was

investigating the forgeries, but did not ask whether Aimee was
charged.

R. 114:26.

He did discuss with Aimee "that there may

be jurisdictions or other deputies or officers that would be
looking at her for activity that she's engaged in [but that he]
didn't know of any."

R. 114:26. He also told her that "there

could be some heat rolling [her] way, in connection with [the]
forgeries."

R. 114:38.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Aimee acted as an agent for Deputy Delahunty when she
searched Appellant's home and seized items.

Delahunty was aware

of Aimee's search, encouraged her to conduct the search and
participated in the search by picking Aimee up in West Jordan,
driving her to the McArthur home in Holladay, and waiting in the
driveway while she went inside and seized the items. Aimee could
11
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not have consented to the search of McArthur's home and Deputy
Delahunty could not otherwise have conducted the search himself.
The Fourth Amendment was therefore violated by Aimeers search of
the residence.
The search pursuant to the warrant was the fruit of Aimee's
illegal search.

The affidavit relied solely on items seized and

observed by Aimee during the illegal search to establish probable
cause to believe that items taken from the burglary would be
found in McArthur's home.

Evidence seized during the search by

officers should therefore be suppressed.
The search pursuant to the search warrant also violated the
Fourth Amendment since Deputy Delahunty intentionally or
recklessly omitted material information and conveyed a false
impression about Aimee's role. When the affidavit is assessed in
light of the omissions and misrepresentations, it fails to
establish probable cause.

Evidence seized pursuant to the

warrant should be suppressed.
McArthur's statements when he was arrested shortly after the
search warrant was executed should also be suppressed.

The

circumstances indicate that the statements were not sufficiently
attenuated from the police misconduct in using Aimee to conduct a
search and obtaining a search warrant without accurately
detailing information so as to allow their admission.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES THAT ALL OF THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM APPELLANT'S HOME ALONG WITH
APPELLANT'S STATEMENTS FOLLOWING ARREST BE SUPPRESSED.
12
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Amend. IV,
U.S. Const.

When a search is conducted pursuant to a search

warrant, the evidence must be suppressed where the search warrant
fails to establish probable cause, is the fruit of prior illegal
activity, or when material misrepresentations or omissions
impacted on the existence of probable cause.

In this case, the

affidavit in support of the search warrant was based primarily on
evidence which was illegally seized by Aimee, who was acting as a
government agent.

Therefore, the search warrant was the fruit of

the prior illegality.

Additionally, the officer intentionally or

recklessly misrepresented material facts and omitted material
information; when the affidavit is considered in light of the
misrepresentations and omissions, it fails to establish probable
cause.

Further, Appellant's arrest was the fruit of the illegal

search; his statements to officers following arrest must likewise
be suppressed.
A. AIMEE ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE FROM APPELLANT'S
HOME, IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
When Aimee entered Appellant's home on June 30, 1997, she
was acting as a government agent and her warrantless search
violated the Fourth Amendment.

Moreover, she could not consent

to a search of the McArthur home, and Delahunty could not have
otherwise conducted a search.
1. Aimee Acted as an Agent for Deputy Delahunty When
She Searched Appellant's Home.
While the Fourth Amendment protection does not apply to
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

searches conducted by private individuals acting on their own, it
does apply where the totality of circumstances indicate that the
individual was acting as an agent or instrument of the police.
See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988); State v.
Koury, 824 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Knudsen, 500
N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa App. 1993).
In the "gray area" between the extremes of overt
governmental participation in a search and the complete
absence thereof, the search must be judged according to
the nature of the governmental participation in the
search process and in light of all of the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 (footnotes omitted).

The burden of

establishing governmental involvement is on the defendant.

Id.;

Koury, 824 P.2d at 477.
11

[0] vert governmental participation in a search" or an

express request by officers that the private individual conduct
the search is not required in order to demonstrate sufficient
governmental involvement to implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Instead, passive acquiescence by officers in the individual's
actions also implicates the Fourth Amendment protection.

See

State v. Anonymous, 379 A.2d 946, 947 (Conn. 1977) (citing inter
alia, Moodv v. United States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. Ct. App. I960));
People v. Tarantino, 290 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1955); see also Koury,
824 P.2d at 477 (first factor to be considered is "whether
government knew of or acquiesced to the search); Watts, 750 P.2d
at 1222 (same).
The Supreme Court articulated "[t]wo critical areas of
inquiry ... which bear upon the determination of whether a
14
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private person or body has conducted a search as a governmental
agent."
11

Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222.

Those two critical areas are:

(1) the government's knowledge of and acquiescence in the

intrusive conduct, and (2) the intent and purpose of the
person(s) or body(ies) conducting the search."

Id. at 1222.

"As part of the inquiry in Watts, the Supreme Court considered
factors such as whether there was an ongoing relationship between
the informant and the police, whether the informant was rewarded
for his efforts, and whether the police gave the informant any
direction or guidance."
750 P.2d at 1222-23).

Kourv, 824 P.2d at 477 (citing Watts,
Moreover, in assessing these areas of

inquiry, two basic principles must be kept in mind:

(1) "law

enforcement agencies out of necessity rely heavily on
informants," and (2) the Fourth Amendment "preclude[s] law
enforcement officers or agencies from having informants do for
them what they cannot legally do themselves."

Watts, 750 P.2d

at 1221.
In Watts, the Supreme Court held that an agency relationship
did not exist where officers did nothing more than tell an
informant that a case against him would be dismissed if he
provided officers with information which led to a criminal
charge.

Id. at 1220.

The Court reasoned that any subsequent

search made by the informant was a private search.

Although

there was some governmental involvement, the "'offer' given to
the informant was

x

far too vague and general to constitute

governmental knowledge of the search.'"

Id. at 1223.
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Moreover,

the defendant in Watts was motivated by his personal desire to
not be prosecuted for a crime.

Given these factors and the lack

of ongoing relationship between officers and the informant, the
Court concluded that the informant's "specific actions were for
the most part his own and were not substantially motivated by the
prompting and encouragement of the [officers]."

Id.

In Koury, this Court did not reach the issue of whether the
private citizen, Joseph Horvath, acted as an agent for officers
when he observed cocaine residue in the defendant's house.
Instead, this Court concluded that Horvath, who had a key and
periodically entered the house to feed the defendant's pets, had
permission to be in the house and that "it was proper for him to
report [to officers] what he observed in defendant's house."
Koury, 824 P.2d at 478.

This Court concluded:

We find no error in the court's conclusion that
Horvath's entry into defendant's house was not
intrusive and therefore, lawful. Accordingly, it was
proper for him to report what he observed in
defendant's house.
Kourv, 824 P.2d at 478.
In Koury, the officers did not direct Horvath in anyway, and
conducted their own investigation after Horvath relayed his
observations.

This Court focused on Horvath's observations while

inside the house, concluding that since Horvath had permission to
be inside, he could properly report what he saw inside.

By

contrast, Aimee removed items, without permission to do so, from
McArthur's house.
Other courts have formulated tests similar to that in Watts
16
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for determining whether a citizen acted as an agent of the state.
For instance, in State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 731 (Iowa 1986),
rev'd

on other

grounds,

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the

Iowa Supreme Court articulated the following test:
Whether a private citizen has become an agent or
instrument of the state depends on the total
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct.
Factors variously considered and weighed by courts
include: (1) whether the state directly or indirectly
encouraged or participated in the challenged conduct;
(2) whether the state, although knowing the challenged
conduct was occurring or likely to occur, did nothing
to prevent it; (3) whether the challenged conduct was
intended to assist law enforcement officials or to
further some other end; and (4) whether law enforcement
officials themselves could have undertaken the conduct
without violating the defendant's fourth amendment
rights.
Knudsen, 500 N.W.2d at 86 (quoting Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 731
(citations omitted)).8
Various courts have held that under the totality of the
circumstances, a private citizen was acting as an agent or
instrument of the government.

See, e.g., State v. Becich, 509

P.2d 1232 (Or. 1973) (Fourth Amendment violated where officer
asked private individual to obtain items, drove by while
8

This test is essentially the same as the test articulated
in Watts. The first two factors in the Coy test address the first
Watts factor--"the government's knowledge of and acquiescence in
the intrusive conduct." See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221. The third
factor in the Coy test is similar to the second Watts factor--"the
intent and purpose of the person(s) or body(ies) conducting the
search." Id. The final Coy factor is one of the basic principles
articulated in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221; if the , government could
have conducted the search without violating the Fourth Amendment,
inquiry into whether the informant was an agent or instrument of
the government is unnecessary.
Appellant's argument that the
officer could not have conducted the search since Aimee could not
consent to a search of Appellant's home addresses this fourth Coy
factor. See discussion infra at 22-32.
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individual was removing items from defendant's house, and met
individual nearby to obtain items); Moody v. United States, 163
A.2d at 339-41 (Fourth Amendment violated where officer stood in
hallway while complaining witness entered through open door of
defendant's apartment and obtained complaining witness's
possessions which were in plain view inside apartment);
Commonwealth v. Boreckv, 419 A.2d 753, 755 (Pa. Super. 1980)
(Fourth Amendment violated where officer knew of search
beforehand and acquiesced in search); State v. Bovnton, 574 P.2d
133 0 (Haw. 1978) (Fourth Amendment violated by search by
informant who was actively recruited by officers and paid a
minimal amount for information over a year-long period even
though officers did not direct informant to conduct search).
In Anonymous, 379 A.2d at 947, the officers had several
contacts with an informer who was "encouraged to continue his
surveillance of the defendants and to furnish such information as
he might acquire."

Anonymous, 379 A.2d at 947.

After the

informer stole cocaine from the defendants, the officers used the
cocaine as the basis for obtaining a search warrant.

Although

the officers did not suggest that the informer take anything from
defendants' home, the court recognized that "they must have
realized that the substance handed to them by the informer had
been stolen from the defendants."

Id. at 947.

The circumstances in Becich also required suppression.
officer who was investigating a burglary questioned Boley, a
suspect in that burglary.

Boley told the officer that the
18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

An

defendant committed the crime and that the stolen items were at
the defendant's house and Boley could get them back.

The officer

told Boley that he would drive by and observe Boley taking the
items from defendant's house, then meet Boley in a nearby school
parking lot. After seeing Boley at the defendant's house loading
boxes into his car, the officer met Boley at the school and
received the evidence.

He thereafter obtained a search warrant

and found marijuana in the defendant's house while executing the
warrant.

Becich, 509 P.2d at 1234.

The court held that the officer's involvement, including his
request for return of the stolen items, his surveillance as Boley
took the items, and his knowledge that he would need a search
warrant, were sufficient to taint the seizure.

In reaching that

decision, the court recognized that the purpose for the
exclusionary rule would be served by suppressing the evidence in
that case.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule in this type
of case is to discourage officials from participating
or engaging indirectly in searches which would be
illegal if conducted by the official. It seems clear
that exclusion of the evidence in this case would be in
consonance with the purpose of the exclusionary rule if
the extent of participation of the officer in the
unlawful search was sufficient to make the police a
party to the illegal search. The extent of official
involvement in the total enterprise is the crucial
element.
Becich, 509 P.2d at 1234 (citation omitted); see also Boynton,
574 P.2d at 1336 (recognizing that exclusionary rule served by
suppressing evidence and that admitting evidence "would tempt the
police to use persons unaffected by the fourth amendment
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restriction to obtain evidence which they cannot directly
obtain").
In the present case, pursuant to the factors articulated in
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222, Aimee acted as an agent for Deputy
Delahunty when she searched Appellant's home.9

The first factor

in Watts weighs in favor of finding an agency relationship since
Deputy Delahunty knew of, acquiesced in, and even encouraged the
intrusive conduct.

Although Delahunty claimed that Aimee came up

with the idea of searching McArthur's home and seizing items, the
deputy acknowledged that he actively agreed to it and told Aimee
that it would be great if she took some of the property from
McArthur's home.

R. 114:19.

This conduct alone was sufficient

to establish "the government's knowledge and acquiescence in the
intrusive conduct."

See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222.

Additional evidence existed, however, which established that
the government knew of and acquiesced in the conduct, and
otherwise created an agency relationship with Aimee.

Delahunty

directly encouraged Aimee and participated in Aimee's
activities.10

In addition to telling Aimee it would be great if

she took some things, Delahunty enabled her to do so by picking
her up in West Jordan and transporting her to the house.
9

The trial judge did not make a determination as to whether
Aimee was acting as an agent for the deputy when she searched the
McArthur home.
Instead, he concluded that the affidavit was
supported by probable cause. R. 91.
10

The first Coy factor--"whether the state directly or
indirectly encouraged or participated in the challenged conduct..."
(Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 731)--weighs in favor of an agency
relationship.
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Additionally, he sat in the car in the driveway and immediately
took the items from Aimee when she returned to the car.

Further,

Deputy Delahunty knew of Aimee's planned conduct and did nothing
to prevent it11; indeed, he actively encouraged it. Hence,
under the first Watts factor, an agency relationship existed in
this case.
The second Watts factor also weighs in favor of an agency
relationship.

The challenged conduct--Aimee's search of the

house--was intended to assist law enforcement officials.
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221.

See

Indeed, Deputy Delahunty immediately

took the seized property from Aimee and obtained a search warrant
the next day.

Moreover, Delahunty emphasized that he had nothing

to do with any potential charges against Aimee, and indicated
that Aimee was not motivated by any potential benefit to herself.
Instead, she entered the McArthur house and provided seized items
to officers to aid them in their investigation of Appellant.
Unlike the situation in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1220, Aimee was
not given a specific offer that charges against her would be
dismissed if she obtained evidence against McArthur.

Although

Aimee faced potential charges, Delahunty was not responsible for
those charges, and told her "that there may be jurisdictions or
other deputies or officers that would be looking at her for
activity that's she's engaged in, [but that he] didn't know of

11

The second Coy factor also weighs in favor of an agency
relationship since Delahunty knew "the challenged conduct was
occurring or likely to occur, [and] did nothing to prevent it."
Cov, 397 N.W.2d at 731.
21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

any."

R. 114:26.

Any possible benefit to Aimee in taking the

evidence was so amorphous and general that it fails to defeat
this factor.
Finally, Delahunty could not have conducted the search
himself.

This fourth factor articulated in Coy, 397 N.W.2d at

731, is one of the principles embraced in Watts, 750 P.2d at
1221.

Aimee could not have consented to a search as set forth

more fully in subpart 2(a). Additionally, there were not exigent
circumstances which would have justified a search.

Finally,

absent Aimee's search and seizure of items, the officers did not
have probable cause to believe items taken in the burglary would
be found in the McArthur home.
Under the totality of circumstances, Aimee was an agent of
Deputy Delahunty when she searched McArthur's home cind seized
items therein.

Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated

by her conduct.
2. Deputy Delahunty Could Not Have Conducted the
Search.
(a) Aimee Could Not Consent to a Search of Appellant's
Home.
"Voluntary consent to search is one of the well established
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."
State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah App. 1991).

Consent to

search can be given by the defendant or by " x a third party who
possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.'"
State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 532 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting
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United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988,
993 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974)).
In Matlock, the United States Supreme Court held that a
third party other than the defendant could consent to a search
where the third party had common authority over the area
searched.

The Court indicated that

[cjommon authority to consent to search rests ... on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it
is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in
his own right and that the others have assumed the risk
that one of their number might permit the common area
to be searched.
Id.
A warrantless entry made pursuant to third party consent
does not violate the Fourth Amendment where the officers
reasonably believed at the time of the search that the third
party had common authority and the ability to consent even if it
is later learned that no such common authority existed.

See

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d
148 (1990).
The burden is on the state to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence common authority to consent or a reasonable belief
by officers that the third party had common authority to consent.
Brown, 853 P.2d at 855.

On appeal, this court reviews the trial

judge's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard; it reviews the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion
for correctness, according the trial judge "a measure of
discretion."

Davis, 965 P.2d at 532 (citing Elder, 815 P.2d at
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1343) .
In Davis, this Court held that the state had failed to
establish its burden of proving that the officers reasonably
believed that the defendant had common authority over a vehicle
parked on the premises.

Instead, the officers merely assumed

that common authority existed without ascertaining whether the
vehicle belonged to someone else or whether the defendant had
joint access or control.12

Davis demonstrates that where the

officer fails to establish common authority to consent, he does
not have a reasonable belief that the search is proper.
In Elder, this Court held that a homeowner's daughter who
had been given keys to the house in order to pick up personal
items for her hospitalized mother did not have common authority
to consent to a search of the home's crawlspace.
at 1343-5.

Elder, 815 P.2d

This Court reasoned that the evidence did not support

an inference that the daughter had the authority to care for her
mother's home.

Id. at 1343.

Although the evidence established

that the mother gave the daughter keys to " x the living areas of
her home' to pick up some personal items," the daughter's
testimony as to her authority was "at odds" with an inference
that she had authority to care for the home, and "it does not
12

Davis involved the search of a parolee's house and
surrounding property.
Davis, 965 P. 2d at 527-28.
The "common
authority" test of Matlock applies to parole searches in
determining what areas can properly be searched pursuant to the
lesser reasonable cause standard for parole searches; areas where
the parolee has "common authority" as outlined in Matlock are
subject to parole search. Hence, the common authority analysis in
Davis is applicable to third party consent searches. See Davis,
965 P.2d at 531-35.
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follow from the delivery of keys, with the request that specific
items be fetched, that one has necessarily been asked to care for
a home, much less that one has become entitled to invite others
into the home to search."

Id.

This Court concluded that the

delivery of the keys to fetch items did not give the daughter
authority to consent to a search of the crawlspace, an area which
was not entered with the use of the keys.
Moreover, this Court concluded in Elder that it was not
reasonable for the officers to believe that the daughter had the
authority to consent to a search of the crawlspace because
The officers who conducted the search knew these facts
at the outset: (1) [the daughter] did not live at the
house, (2) both occupants of the house were absent, (3)
[the daughter] did not have a key to the crawlspace,
and (4) [the daughter's] husband had to kick the
crawlspace door open to gain access to the crawlspace.
Confronted with these facts, it is not possible for the
officers to have reasonably believed that [the
daughter] had authority to consent to the search.
Id. at 1344.
By comparison, in Brown, 853 P.2d at 855, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the owner of a trailer at a brine shrimp camp had
common authority to consent to a search of the common areas of a
trailer.

The evidence showed that ground radios and the camp

refrigerator, which was used to store food for all people in the
camp, were in the trailer.

The employees and owner could enter

the trailer at any time to obtain food or the radios.

Based on

this, the Court held that the owner "had an unrestricted right of
access to at least the common area" of the trailer and therefore
"had the right to grant the officers authority to enter that
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area."

Brown, 853 P.2d at 856.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States
v. Harris, 534 F.2d 95, 97 (7th Cir. 1976), that officers had not
obtained proper third party consent to search since the
individual who consented did not have common authority over the
property.

Edwardsen, the third party, had known the defendant

for three weeks and had been at the defendant's apartment a dozen
times.

During Edwardsen's last visit, the defendant had left and

told Edwardsen to lock the door on his way out.

Edwardsen, after

being arrested, told officers that there was evidence of a
robbery in the apartment.

Edwardsen also told officers "that he

had permission to use the apartment, but did not have a key."
Id. at 96.

In addition, Edwardsen told officers they could gain

access through a sliding glass door, which they did.

In

concluding that Edwardsen did not have common authority over the
apartment, the court reasoned that "since [defendant] did not
give Edwardsen a key, it can hardly be surmised that he expected
Edwardsen to enter and leave the locked apartment at will."

Id.

Since the lack of key was also known to the officers, the search
violated the Fourth Amendment.
In the present case, the trial judge found that (1) Aimee
had permission to enter the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997;
(2) she had habitually come and gone from the residence; (3) she
lived at the McArthur residence; (4) McArthur "expected and was
aware that Aimee had a right to enter the house on June 30,
1997"; and (6) Aimee was a citizen informant.

R. 90, 114:105.
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The finding that Aimee lived in the house on June 30, 1997
is clearly erroneous.13

The marshaled evidence supporting the

finding that Aimee lived in the house on June 30 is as follows:
1.

Deputy Delahunty testified that when he went to the

McArthur home on June 16, 1997, Aimee was there, and that she
lived at the house in mid-June, 1997.
2.

Aimee told Delahunty she had access to the house.

R. 114:17.

She told him she had access to the house because she

was living there.

R. 114:19.

with items from the house.
3.

R. 114:7, 16.

She entered the house and returned

R. 114:22-3.

When Delahunty drove to the house on June 30, 1997,

Aimee told him to park in the driveway while she went inside.
R. 114:20.
Delahunty's testimony as to whether Aimee lived at the
McArthur house on June 30, 1997 was conflicting, however, and, as
13

The determination that Aimee was a citizen informant is a
legal conclusion rather than a factual finding, and is incorrect.
See generally Koury, 824 P.2d at 477 (determination as to whether
individual was a police agent is a question of law) . A citizen
informant is someone who is the victim or witness of a crime, and
who "'volunteer [s] information out of concern for the community and
not for personal benefit.'11 Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P. 2d
231, 235 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284,
286 (Utah App. 1990)). By contrast, "[a] police informant is one
who gains information through involvement in criminal activity or
who is "'motivated ... by pecuniary gain.'"" Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at
238 n. 2 (quoting State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216, 219 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (further citation omitted).
Aimee was not a
concerned citizen who voluntarily got involved out of the goodness
of her heart.
Instead, she gained information through her
involvement with the criminal activity, became involved only when
the deputy sought her out, and had concerns about possible criminal
charges against herself when supplying information.
Her
information did not have the heightened reliability accorded
citizen informants; instead, it was tainted by her involvement and
self-interest. See discussion infra at 40-41.
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a whole, establishes that Aimee was not living in the McArthur
house at that time.

Delahunty testified that as of June 19,

Aimee was staying with a friend in West Jordan.
64.

R. 114:18, 19,

Additionally, he testified that as of June 19, he did not

know where Aimee was living, and that she may not have been
living at the McArthur house.

R. 114:64.

When asked whether he

believed Aimee when she said she was living at the house on
June 30, Delahunty testified that he believed she had access to
the house, "that she lived there, that she was staying there,
living there off and on."

R. 114:52.

Additionally, on June 19, 1997, Delahunty picked Aimee up at
a house in West Jordan where he thought she was staying with a
friend.

R. 114:18.

Jordan on June 30.

Delahunty again picked Aimee up in West
R. 114:18.

Aimee told Delahunty that "she

had some of her personal property that she needed to pick up
pending her move to her mother's home."

R. 114:19.

Given the contradictions in Delahunty's testimony and his
testimony as a whole, the trial judge's finding that Aimee lived
in the McArthur home on June 3 0 was unreasonable and clearly
erroneous.

In addition, Deputy Lone testified that although

Aimee occasionally stayed as a guest at the McArthur home, the
home was not her permanent residence.

R. 114:74.

Moreover,

McArthur's mother testified that Aimee did not live in the home.
R. 114:79.

The clear weight of the evidence establishes that

Aimee was not living in the McArthur home on June 30.
Regardless of whether the finding that Aimee lived in the
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McArthur home on June 3 0 is clearly erroneous, the facts
demonstrate that Aimee did not have sufficient relationship with
the property to consent to a search.

Assuming that the finding

that Aimee lived there was clearly erroneous, the remaining
evidence of her relationship with the McArthur property
established that she occasionally came and went as a guest and
that she knew how to enter through an open sliding glass door.
Guests do not have the authority to consent to a search.

See

generally Elder, 815 P.2d at 1343-5 (daughter who had keys to
house could not consent to search of crawl space).
Even if Aimee were "living" at the McArthur house, she did
not have the authority to consent to a search of the house as a
whole or McArthur's bedroom.

First, the state presented no

evidence that Aimee had common authority over McArthur's bedroom
at the time of her search.

The evidence showed only that at some

point prior to June 30, Aimee, Appellant and Appellant's mother
lived in the upstairs front portion of the McArthur house.
R. 114:78.

Aimee took the knife from Appellant's bedroom.

State's Exh. 1 at 2.

The state failed to sustain its burden of

establishing that Aimee had common authority over the bedroom.
See Davis, 965 P.2d at 534 (officers failed to establish that
parolee had common authority over vehicle).
Second, even if Aimee were "living" at the McArthur home,
the state failed to establish that she had a sufficient
relationship with the property to establish common authority to
consent.

The evidence unequivocally established that even if
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Aimee were "living" at the McArthur residence on June 30, such
residence was only temporary and sporadic.

At the end of May,

she was "living" in an apartment on Redwood Road.
she was staying with a friend in West Jordan.
June, she was in South Dakota.

By June 19,

Sometime during

At the end of June, she was

planning to move back in with her mother in Heber City and
removing the last of her personal items from the home.
At best, Aimee was a transient guest who was staying at the
McArthur residence on June 30.

As a transient guest, she did not

have sufficient relationship with the property to consent to a
search.14
Under these circumstances where Aimee did not have the
authority to consent to a search, Delahunty could not have
conducted the warrantless search.
(b) Delahunty Did Not Otherwise Have Authority to
Search Appellant's Home When Aimee Conducted the Search
on June 3 0.
On June 30, 1997, Delahunty could not have conducted the
search himself.

He did not have a warrant, and none of the

exceptions to the warrant requirement were met.
at 854.

Those exceptions include:

Brown, 853 P.2d

(a) consent searches, (b)

searches involving probable cause and exigent circumstances, (c)
seizures of evidence in plain view following a lawful intrusion
or in a public place, and (d) searches incident to arrest.
14

Nor would it have been reasonable for Delahunty to believe
Aimee had the authority to consent under these circumstances. See
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177; Davis, 965 P.2d at 534.
Indeed, Delahunty acknowledged that he did not believe that Aimee
could consent to a search. R. 114:54.
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See id.
As set forth previously, Aimee did not have the authority to
consent.

Additionally, McArthur, who did not even know a search

was occurring, did not consent.

Nor do the facts support a plain

view analysis or search incident to arrest since McArthur was
arrested days later, and the officer did not have a lawful right
to be in the house.
Moreover, probable cause and exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search did not exist.

The state bears

an especially heavy burden in establishing probable cause and
exigent circumstances when a warrantless search of a house is
involved.

State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997).

Exigent circumstances include circumstances where the delay
in obtaining a search warrant "would risk 'physical harm to the
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence,
[or] the escape of the suspect.'"

State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,

17 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted).

McArthur was unaware of

the police interest in him and therefore none of these concerns
were heightened.

In addition, there is no evidence in this case

that any of these exigent circumstances existed.
Nor did probable cause to search the McArthur home exist
when Aimee conducted her search.

Probable cause is based on the

totality of circumstances; "" [p]robable cause exists where 'the
facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable
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caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed.""

Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 (quoting State v. Dorsey,

731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949))).
Although Aimee told Delahunty that items from the burglary
were in the McArthur home, Aimee's reliability was suspect due to
her possession of items stolen in the burglary and her
involvement in other crimes, including forgery, which is a
classic crime of dishonesty.

See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 18

(Utah App. 1988) (recognizing that crimes of dishonesty which
impeach credibility under Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) are crimes
involving fraud or deceit).

Aimee's word was not "reasonably

trustworthy" given her status as a police informant and her
background to establish probable cause.

See Kaysville City v.

Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 238 (Utah App. 1997) (police informant has
less reliability than citizen informant); State v. Potter, 860
P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993) (reliability of police informant's
information not established).

In the absence of corroboration of

her statements that items taken in the burglary were in the
McArthur house, Delahunty lacked probable cause to search the
house.
Since an exception to the warrant requirement did not exist
when Aimee searched McArthur's home, Delahunty could not have
conducted the search.

Aimee's search of McArthur's home violated

the Fourth Amendment.
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B. INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FRUIT OF THE
ILLEGAL SEARCH; ALL ITEMS SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH
WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained from
the search of McArthur's home pursuant to a search warrant be
suppressed.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9

L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); Borecky, 419 A.2d at 757.
Because the evidence seized by Aimee during the illegal search
contributed significantly to the affidavit in support of the
search warrant, the evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrant was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417.

See Wong Sun, 371

Indeed, the connection between

Aimee's unlawful search and the obtaining of the search warrant
is not "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the unlawful
activity.

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417.

In Becich, 509 P.2d at 1234, the court held that evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant must be suppressed since the
warrant was based on a prior illegality.

"[A]n intervening act

is required to purge the taint of the initial illegality."
(footnote omitted).

Id.

Because the illegal seizure by the police

agent in Becich "prompted the securing of the search warrant ...
[and] [t]he progression was straight, from the initial seizure to
the search warrant" and seizure of contraband, the court held
that the contraband must be suppressed.

Id.

The court in Anonymous also suppressed evidence seized
pursuant to a search warrant because the evidence seized pursuant
to the warrant was tainted by the original illegal seizure by a
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police agent.

See Anonymous, 379 A.2d at 947 (citing

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 64
L.Ed. 319, 40 S.Ct. 182 (1920) (suppressing evidence seized
pursuant to warrant because evidence seized pursuant to original
illegality "was a highly significant part of the affidavit," and
warrant was therefore "tainted with the original illegality as
the xfruit of the poisonous tree'")); see also Borecky, 419 A.2d
at 757 (suppressing evidence seized pursuant to warrant as "fruit
of the poisonous tree" where "the sample contraband seized by the
informant obviously supplied the foundation upon which the
subsequent search warrant was obtained ... " ) ; Boynton, 574 P.2d
at 1336 (suppressing evidence seized pursuant to search warrant
where "search warrant was based upon the information gleaned from
the informant's search").
In this case, the warrant was the direct fruit of the Fourth
Amendment violation.
she left the house.

Delahunty took the items from Aimee when
He immediately set about obtaining a

warrant, as evidenced by the fact that he obtained it the next
day.

The affidavit relies solely on the items Aimee seized

and/or observed on June 30, 1997 as the basis for establishing
that items from the burglary were in the McArthur house.

Given

these circumstances, the affidavit and warrant are the fruit of
the poisonous tree; items seized during Aimee's search as well as
items seized pursuant to the search warrant should be suppressed.
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determination as to whether it supports a finding of probable
cause.

If probable cause does not exist without the excised

material, the search warrant must be voided and the items seized
under the warrant excluded "to the same extent as if probable
cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit."

Id.

A similar approach is required where an officer
intentionally or recklessly omits material information from a
search warrant affidavit.

See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190. The

material which was intentionally or recklessly omitted must be
added to the affidavit and assessed with the remaining
information to determine whether probable cause would have
existed if the magistrate had been made aware of the omitted
information.

Id.

In Nielsen, the Court held that the defendant established
that the officer had intentionally or recklessly included false
statements and omitted material information from the affidavit.
Id. at 191.

The officer in Nielsen swore in the affidavit that a

confidential informant ("C.I.") had given him certain
information, and attested to the informant's reliability based on
prior transactions with the C.I. At the preliminary hearing, the
officer essentially reiterated this information.

Id. at 190.

Sometime after the preliminary hearing, the state revealed that
the affiant did not know or have contact with the C.I. and had
received the information from another officer who had worked with
the C.I.

Id.

The Supreme Court found the state's argument that the
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I

also faced potential charges of forgery and receiving stolen
property.
2.

R. 114:4-5, 35-6, 37.
Aimee's work for Deputy Delahunty came about because she

had been picked up passing stolen checks.
3.

R. 114:40.

On June 30, 1997, Deputy Delahunty picked Aimee up in

West Jordan and drove her to the McArthur home so that she could
go inside and take items.

R. 114:18, 19, 24-5, 28, 46, 65.

also picked her up in West Jordan on June 19.
4.

He

R. 114:17.

Deputy Delahunty waited in the driveway while Aimee went

inside and took items, and immediately took the seized items from
Aimee when she returned to the car.
5.
search.
home.

R. 114:23, 46.

Delahunty did not believe Aimee could consent to a
Aimee was, at best, temporarily living in the McArthur

R. 19, 64.
The omission of this information was intentional or

reckless.

Delahunty was well aware that Aimee was implicated in

the forgeries, receipt of stolen property and burglary.
R. 114:25, 26.

As an experienced police officer, he certainly

knew that this information impacted on Aimee's credibility and
would be important to the magistrate in assessing whether
probable cause existed.

As was the case in Nielsen, any claim

that the omission was not intentional or reckless is "entirely
unpersuasive."

Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190.

Deputy Delahunty was

aware "of the need for accuracy ... [and] the importance of
absolute truthfulness in any statements made under oath."
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191.

See

He therefore was aware of the need for
38
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First, the reliability of any statements made by Aimee were
severely undercut by her involvement in the various crimes and
her role as a police informant.

As set forth supra at 27,

fn. 13, the trial judge's determination that Aimee was a citizen
informant was incorrect.15

A citizen informant "volunteer[s]

information out of concern for the community and not for personal
benefit."

Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 (citation omitted).

The

marshaled evidence in support of the court's determination is
comprised only of Deputy Delahunty's testimony that Aimee was
helping him out of the goodness of her heart and because she
found religion.

R. 114:3 9.16

By contrast, the evidence unequivocally shows that (1) Aimee
was not a volunteer; she worked with Delahunty only after he
sought out; (2) she did not provide information out of concern
for the community; instead, she volunteered information only
after being picked up for passing checks stolen in the burglary;
(3) she gained her information through criminal involvement; and
(4) she had committed crimes of dishonesty which impacted on her
credibility.
informant.

R. 114:4-5, 26, 39.

Hence, Aimee was a police

See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235.

Absent the omitted information, the affidavit implies that

15

As set forth supra at 27, the determination as to whether
an individual is a police or citizen informant is a conclusion of
law. While underlying factual findings are subject to a clearly
erroneous standard of review, the conclusion as to the type of
informant is reviewed for correctness.
16

To the extent this Court considers the determination that
Aimee was a citizen informant, such finding was clearly erroneous.
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Aimee's statements, the omitted information precludes the
consideration of the items seized by Aimee.

Had the magistrate

been told that Deputy Delahunty encouraged, participated in, and,
at the very least, acquiesced in Aimee's search of the McArthur
home, the magistrate would have been required to disregard those
items and the information that Aimee seized them from the house,
as the fruit of the poisonous tree.

See supra at 12-35.

Aimee's statements as to what she observed inside the house
are also the fruit of Aimee's illegal search.

She entered the

McArthur house under false pretenses as a police agent.

Although

McArthur allowed her inside as a guest, he did not knowingly and
voluntarily consent for her to enter and search.

Since Aimee was

a police agent when she entered, the requirements for a knowing
and voluntary consent to police officers to search applies with
full force to Aimee.

In addition, Delahunty did not search Aimee

before she entered the house. Although he claimed she was not
wearing enough clothing to hide the items before entering, the
items were small and she managed to remove them without being
seen by McArthur.
Without Aimee's statements as to what she observed and the
information as to what she seized, there is no information
demonstrating that items taken in the burglary could be found at
McArthur's house.17

Even if Aimee's statements as to what she

saw inside the house were included, the affidavit would not
17

While Aimee had previously told Delahunty of McArthur's
involvement, she also told him that the stolen items had been taken
to Newman's house, not McArthur's.
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The good faith exception set forth in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not apply in this case. For the
exception to apply, "the officer's reliance on the magistrate's
probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency cf
the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 922.
Reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable since
Delahunty recklessly or intentionally omitted material informs :; ::
See Potter, 860 P.2d at 958 (good faith exception does not apply,
and suppression is appropriate where magistrate intentionally or
recklessly misled by information in affidavit), Additionally, the
good faith exception does not apply because the warrar.! w.-*-obtained as the fruit of an illegal search.
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Miranda warnings were given, the temporal proximity of the
illegality and the confession, the absence or presence of
intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct."

Allen, 839 P.2d at 300-01 (citing State v.

Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-91 n. 4 (Utah 1990) (further citation
omitted)).
In Allen, the Court held that the defendant's confessions
were sufficiently attenuated from any misconduct by Montana
police, including arresting the defendant in Idaho, because (1)
the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and knowingly
and voluntarily waived them; (2) the defendant made his
incriminating statements more than a day after his arrest, which
was "a sufficient period of time for the tension that arose
during the arrest to subside considerable, if not completely";
(3) "[n]othing in the record indicate[d] that the alleged
misconduct was an aid in the investigation"; (4) the record did
not "indicate [] that the behavior of the officers in arresting
the defendant was flagrant, in light of his belligerence and
uncooperative attitude"; and (5) the illegal arrest occurred
because the officers were in hot pursuit of the defendant.
Allen, 839 P.2d at 301.
In contrast, in the present case, (1) McArthur's
incriminating statements were made immediately after arrest; the
arrest itself was based on items seized in the illegal search,
(2) the misconduct in using Aimee as a police agent to conduct a
search as well as the misconduct in constructing the affidavit
44
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immediate, there were no intervening circumstances, and the
police misconduct in using Aimee to search McArthur's house, then
using the fruits of that search to obtain a search warrant, and
the misconduct in intentionally or recklessly failing to fully
and accurately construct the affidavit were flagrant in light of
clear mandates in case law.
Because McArthur's statements were not sufficiently
attenuated from the police misconduct, they must be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant Michael McArthur respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the trial court order denying his motion
to suppress.

Since Appellant's conviction was based on a

conditional plea, Appellant further requests that his convictions
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

j&t

day of February, 1999.

(

\jk-<? (/toy

JSAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971901299 FS

MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PRESENT
Clerk:
jaredl
Prosecutor: JIM COPE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): REBECCA C HYDE

HOMER WILKINSON
June 12, 1998

22/2. ?£l<?

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 29, 1965
Video
Tape Count: 9.41
CHARGES
1. BURGLARY OF A DWELLING - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/16/1998 Guilty Plea
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/16/1998 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A DWELLING a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Page 1

Annans

Case No: 971901299
Date:
Jun 12, 1998

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Counts are to run concurrent.

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
There is to be no credit for time served,
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00
Due: $0.00

Charge # 2

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00
Due: $0.00

Total Suspended: $20000.00
Total Surcharge: $0
Total Amount Due: $0
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $100.00
Pay to:
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
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Case No: 971901299
Date:
Jun 12, 1998
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 12 month(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.
a.m.
Defendant is to pay a fine of $370.00 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine.
Commitment is to begin immediately.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Defendant is to enter and complete the Odyssey House Inpatient
program.
Defendant is to pay full restitution. Said restitution is to be
imposed jointly and severally with the others involved in this
matter.
Defendant is to cooperate with the authorities in apprehending the
others involved in this incident.
Defendant is to have no victim contact.
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Case No: 971901299
Date:
Jun 12, 1998
SENTENCE PROBATION SERVICE NOTE
There is to be no credit for time served. After 10 months the
defendant may be released directly to AP&P for transport to Odyssey
House, if bed space becomes available.
Dated this

it

day of

, 19?SV~
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AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
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REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

70K

' 2 M4.-56

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

:

v.
MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR,

Case No. 971901299FS
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR, by and through
counsel of record, REBECCA C. HYDE, and hereby moves this Court to suppress all the
evidence obtained as a result a search warrant issued on July 1,1997 and executed on
the premises of 2802 East 3900 South on July 3, 1997.

(See Attachment A).

Defendant bases this motion on the grounds that the affidavit is not supported by
probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
/)

The affidavit is not supported by probable cause because portions of the
information sworn to by the affiant, Officer Vaun Delahunty, ("Delahunty") Salt Lake
County Sheriffs Office, were obtained as a result of illegal police conduct and should
therefore be stricken. Specifically, all information obtained as a result of Aimee Rolfe's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

("Rolfe") visit to the defendant's residence at 2802 East 3900 South on June 30, 1997
should be stricken because Roife was acting as an agent of the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office when she unlawfully entered Defendant's home. State v. Kahoonei. 925
P.2d 294 (Hawaii 1996); State v. Becich. 500 P.2d 1232 (Ore. Ct. App. 1973): United
States v. Reed. 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994).
Delahunty's failure to include in the affidavit material information as to the
State's involvement in Rolfe's unlawful entry into Defendant's home on June 30, 1997
was reckless if not intentional, and thus invalidates the warrant because inclusion of this
critical omitted fact would have prevented a finding of probable cause. Franks v.
Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 LEd.2d 667; Madiwale v. Savaiko. 117 F.3d
1321 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Martin. 615 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1980).
/

Delahunty also intentionally or recklessly omitted information material to the

determination of probable cause by failing to include information that Rolfe was a
suspect in a related forgery case, was a potential suspect in the burglary itself, and
therefore was not merely a "citizen informant" but was a suspect and potential
codefendant. Rolfe's statements thus lack the reliability presumed to exist with a citizen
informant because of a criminal suspect's incentive to curry favor with the police and
gain immunity for herself. Martin. 615 F.2d at 325-26.
Lastly,! Delahunty failed to inform the magistrate that Rolfe was not
searched prior to entering Defendant's home unlawfully or upon leaving the home and
was not within his sight for significant periods of time.

2
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The remaining portions of the affidavit do not establish probable cause. The illegally
obtained information gained as a result of Rolfe's unauthorized entry into Defendant's
home cannot be used to corroborate the remaining portions of the affidavit.
No independent corroboration was provided to the issuing magistrate and no statements
were made verifying the reliability of the informant, Rolfe.
Because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause all
evidence obtained as result of the search should be suppressed including Defendant's
confession to the police. Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S.Ct. 407, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
DATED this

/ J ^ day of Decemb^iv-4967.

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant

(

-

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

| ^ " d a y of December,

1997.

ff^fiiy
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

MAR 2 7 1998
SAlJXAKE COUNTY
Qoeuty ClerK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR,

Case No. 971901299FS
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter came before the Honorable F. Wilkinson on December 22,1997
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Evidence. The plaintiff, the State of Utah was
represented by Richard G. Hamp, and the defendant, Michael Todd McArthur was
represented by Rebecca C. Hyde. Testimony was received by this Court and arguments
presented by counsel.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court makes the following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Aimee Rolfe had permission to be in the Mcarthur residence on June

2.

Aimee Rolfe had habitually come and gone from the McArthur

3.

Aimee Rolfe was living at the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997.

4.

The Defendant, Michael McArthur expected and was aware that Ms.

30, 1997.

residence.

Rolfe freely came and went to and from the residence.
5.

Aimee Rolfe had a right to enter and leave the McArthur house on

June 30, 1997.
6.

Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Though additional information could have been included, the search

warrant was supported by probable cause.
2.

There were no material omissions made which would render the

search warrant invalid.
3.

Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant who had a right to enter the

McArthur home.
DATED this ^ 2 day of February, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

^)UDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON
Third District Court, Division "

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this
1998.

- -

v c

,c

day of February,

~"
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If she had free rein at the house, she
2

could get that property.

3

search.

4

That's not a

And quite frankly, even if she didn't

5

have free rein, if she represented to the

6

police officers she had free rein, that's

7

not a search.

8

THE COURT:

Well, I think there's a big

9

distinction between the cases which the

0

defendant's cited and the facts in this case

1

as far as the informant is concerned.

2

I think in this case, that the Rolfe

3

girl had permission to be in that house,

4

that she had been coming and going; she was

5

living there; that the defendant expected

6

her to be going in and out of the house, and

7

that was a right which she had.

8

I think that the search warrant which

9

was obtained was a valid search warrant.

0

think more could have been put in it as far

1

as the material, but I don't think the

2

omissions that were left out of it make it

3

invalid in any way.

4
5

I think that she was a citizen that
gave him that information.

I don't know
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I

1

that there's anything else you need to put

2

in as far as findings of fact are concerned.

3

But the warrant that was obtained was a

4

valid warrant.

5

informant, who had the right to go in the

6

house, who gave the information to the

7

police.

8
9

The court would deny the motion to
suppress.

0
1
2

The State will prepare the order?

MR. HAMP:

We will, your Honor.

Thank

you.
THE COURT:

3

recess.

4

resolved?

5

The informant was a citizen

We're going to be in

Have you got that other case

MS. HYDE:

If I can have five minutes,

6

I might be able to save us some time in the

7

long run, Judge.

8

(Whereupon, the instant proceedings

9

came to a close.)

0
1
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RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT
NO.
The personal property listed below or set out on the inventory attached hereto was taken
from
the person of Michael Todd McArthur and/or the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South
by virtue of a search warrant dated the

day of July, 1997, and issued by Magistrate

Michael L. Hutchings of the above-entitled court.
I, Vaun Delahunty, by whom this warrant was executed, do swear that the above listed or
below attached inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me
under the warrant, on the

day of

, 1997.

All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody subject
to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which the
property, or things taken, is triable.

Vaun Delahunty

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

1997.

MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS
MAGISTRATE
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PAGE 3
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items:
in the daytime.

Vaun Delahunty
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

/

day of July, 1997,

tttK

^ELLlllUTCIIINGS
MAGISTRATE
^
^
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PAGE 2
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct.
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of
Burglary, Theft and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
Your affiant is a Detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office currently assigned
to the Burglary Investigations Unit. Your affiant has been a Deputy Sheriff for 18 years and has
spent the last two years working specifically with burglary and theft investigations.
Ms. Dorothy Gant, the housekeeper for Mr. Michael Clark, who resides at 2550 East
Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, has told your affiant that on 3 March 1997 she checked
on Mr. Clark's residence while he was out of town and found everything to be in order. On 4
March 1997, she returned and found the house to be ransacked and numerous items of Mr.
Clark's personal property, including numerous guns, computers, electronics, art objects, clothing,
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco automobile and other items missing.
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the first part of March 1997, she was with
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said that they were "going to work."
The next morning when Aimee went back to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men
unloading numerous items of personal property from Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The
next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had obtained the property,
which is Mr. Clark's residence. On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. There she obtained a Kbar Marine
Fighting Knife in a distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's bedroom and a
Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from the an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has identified these items as being among
those stolen in the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a matching crystal ashtray on the
above-mentioned entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the home on 30 June 1997.
Aimee observed the defendant in possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On
30 June 1997, she used it to light up a cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter.
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
RODWICKE YBARRA, Bar No. 4184
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 E. 400 SOUTH
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 3637900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

Michael L. Hutchings

450 South 200 East

MAGISTRATE

ADDRESS

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
County of Salt Lake )
The undersigned affiant, Vaun Delahunty, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That your affiant has reason to believe
That

on the person of Michael Todd Mc Arthur
and/or
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South

In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.

Waterford Crystal Ashtray
Various Lladro porcelain statues
Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter
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RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT
NO.
The personal property listed below or set out on the inventory attached hereto was taken
from
the person of Michael Todd McArthur and/or the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South
by virtue of a search warrant dated the
day of July, 1997, and issued by Magistrate
Michael L. Hutchings of the above-entitled court.
I, Vaun Delahunty, by whom this warrant was executed, do swear that the above listed or
below attached inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me
under the warrant, on the
day of
, 1997.
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained in my custody subject
to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect to which the
property, or things taken, is triable.

Vaun Delahunty

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

1997.

MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS
MAGISTRATE
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SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the above-named or described person of Michael Todd McArthur
and/or premises known as 2802 East 3900 South for the herein-above described property or
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Third
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property
in your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

day of July, 1997.

Michael L. Hutchings
MAGISTRATE
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT
No.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Vaun Delahunty, I am
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

on the person of Michael Todd Mc Arthur
and/or
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South

In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.

Waterford Crystal Ashtray
Various Lladro porcelain statues
Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct.
You are therefore commanded
in the daytime
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items:
in the daytime.

Vaun Delahunty
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

day of July, 1997.

MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS
MAGISTRATE
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct.
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of
Burglary, Theft and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
Your affiant is a Detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office currently assigned
to the Burglary Investigations Unit. Your affiant has been a Deputy Sheriff for 18 years and has
spent the last two years working specifically with burglary and theft investigations.
Ms. Dorothy Gant, the housekeeper for Mr. Michael Clark, who resides at 2550 East
Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, has told your affiant that on 3 March 1997 she checked
on Mr. Clark's residence while he was out of town and found everything to be in order. On 4
March 1997, she returned and found the house to be ransacked and numerous items of Mr.
Clark's personal property, including numerous guns, computers, electronics, art objects, clothing,
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco automobile and other items missing.
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the first part of March 1997, she was with
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said that they were "going to work."
The next morning when Aimee went back to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men
unloading numerous items of personal property from Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The
next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had obtained the property,
which is Mr. Clark's residence. On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. There she obtained a Kbar Marine
Fighting Knife in a distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's bedroom and a
Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from the an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has identified these items as being among
those stolen in the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a matching crystal ashtray on the
above-mentioned entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the home on 30 June 1997.
Aimee observed the defendant in possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On
30 June 1997, she used it to light up a cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter.
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
RODWICKE YBARRA, Bar No. 4184
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 E. 400 SOUTH
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 3637900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

Michael L. Hutchings

450 South 200 East

MAGISTRATE

ADDRESS

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
County of Salt Lake )
The undersigned affiant, Vaun Delahunty, being first duly swom, deposes and says:
That your affiant has reason to believe
That

on the person of Michael Todd McArthur
and/or
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South

In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.

Waterford Crystal Ashtray
Various Lladro porcelain statues
Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM E
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